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Recent Decisions
TORTS-INTERFERENCE WITH THE MARITAL RELATIONSHIP-CRIMINAL
CONVERSATION-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has judicially
abolished the tort of criminal conversation, extinguishing the last
civil remedy available against an outsider who engages in sexual
relations with another's spouse.
Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. 272, 365 A.2d 147 (1976).
During the marriage of plaintiff James T. Fadgen and Bonnie
Hoch Fadgen, defendant George Lenkner engaged in sexual inter-
course with the plaintiff's wife without Fadgen's consent. The plain-
tiff instituted an action in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny
County based on the tort of criminal conversation; this common law
tort imposed civil liability on any person who had sexual relations
with another's spouse. The common pleas court, sitting en banc,
entered judgment against the defendant, basing its decision upon
the latter's written admission that he committed at least one act of
sexual intercourse with the plaintiffs wife while the marriage con-
tinued.) The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed per curiam.1
The principal issue on appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania was whether the common law cause of action for criminal
conversation was a viable form of redress for marital infidelity.
Chief Justice Jones, writing for the majority, first dealt with the
court's prior decision in Karchner v. Mumie,3 decided only eighteen
years earlier, where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld a jury
verdict based on the tort of criminal conversation. Karchner reme-
died a then-existing injustice by extending to the wife the right to
institute an action for criminal conversation; previously the cause
of action was available solely to the husband.4 Viewing Karchner as
only the initial step in "fusing the ancient with the 'modern,' "s the
majority felt that societal and legal changes in the last fifteen years
necessitated abolishing the tort altogether.
1. See Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. 272, 275, 365 A.2d 147, 148 (1976).
2. 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 775, 331 A.2d 537 (1975).
3. 398 Pa. 13, 156 A.2d 537 (1959).
4. Id. at 18, 156 A.2d at 539.
5. 469 Pa. at 276, 365 A.2d at 149.
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Chief Justice Jones noted that of the various causes of action
designed to protect the marital relationship against intentional in-
terferences, criminal conversation came the closest to being a strict
liability tort.' In a suit for criminal conversation, a plaintiff could
prevail merely by establishing a valid marriage and a single adulter-
ous act of intercourse between his or her spouse and the defendant.
Neither the participating spouse's consent to or procurement of the
sexual intercourse, nor the misrepresentation of the spouse's marital
status to the defendant, barred the action.7 Plaintiff's consent to the
adultery was the only complete defense.
The damages aspect of the cause of action for criminal conversa-
tion also disturbed the court. Monetary valuation of strictly psychic
injuries was difficult, and due to the emotion-laden nature of this
action, heavy punitive damages were frequently awarded.8 Also,
this area of the law was especially vulnerable to bogus claims and
thus provided a fertile field for extortion and blackmail? In view of
the perceived harshness of the available damages and the unavail-
ability of valid defenses such as the role of the plaintiff's spouse
in the adulterous relation, the court felt that the tort of criminal
conversation imposed on defendants unreasonable burdens. Add-
ing to this the fact that changed mores concerning sexual relations
had rendered the tort anachronistic, 0 the needed reform in this
area of the law was "a total abolition of a pious yet unrighteous
cause of action."" In the court's view, abrogating this cause of
action was well within the bounds of its judicial power."
6. Id. at 277, 365 A.2d at 149.
7. Various factors could be considered in mitigation of damages, but none barred the
action of criminal conversation altogether. See id. at 277, 365 A.2d at 149-50, citing Tinker
v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 (1904) (solicitation of sexual intercourse by wife not a defense to
action); Antonelli v. Xenakis, 363 Pa. 375, 69 A.2d 102 (1949) (defendant's ignorance of the
marital status of the participating spouse not a defense); Matusak v. Kulczewski, 295 Pa.
208, 145 A. 94 (1928) (unchaste character of adulterous wife or reputation for immorality of
husband seeking damages not a defense); Joseph v. Naylor, 257 Pa. 561, 101 A. 846 (1917)
(disharmony between husband and wife prior to adultery not a bar to action).
8. 469 Pa. at 279, 365 A.2d at 151. A single act of adultery sufficed to entitle the plaintiff
spouse to damages in a suit against the paramour, even though the spouse suffered no further
loss. Id. at 279, 365 A.2d at 150.
9. Id. at 279-280, 365 A.2d at 151. Chief Justice Jones noted that the threat of exposure
and publicity was sufficient to breed corruption and misdealings on the part of unscrupulous
plaintiffs in bringing fraudulent suits.
10. Id. at 279-281, 365 A.2d at 150-51.
11. Id. at 276, 365 A.2d at 149.
12. Id. at 281-82, 365 A.2d at 151-52. See notes 35-41 and accompanying text infra.
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Justice Manderino, concurring, contended that the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade 3 mandated the result
reached by the majority. In his opinion, a married person's choice
to engage in extramarital sexual activity is protected by the right
of privacy guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. 4 In a dissent,
Justice Roberts asserted that there exists no authority for judicially
abrogating a cause of action in tort. He maintained that the tort of
criminal conversation could be both altered to prevent unjust re-
sults and preserved to serve the function of discouraging intentional
disruption of families, while providing a remedy for injuries of a
highly sensitive nature. In his view, whether the interest of a spouse
in exclusive marital intercourse should no longer be afforded legal
protection is a public policy decision which only the legislature is
qualified to make."
The focus of the tort of criminal conversation 6 lies in the hus-
band's proprietary interest in the body and services of his wife,
whose status at common law was that of the husband's chattel and
servant. 7 One of the services to which the master was entitled was
sexual intercourse. The courts expanded the concept of trespass and
established the tort of criminal conversation to protect the hus-
band's right of exclusive marital intercourse. 18 Following the pas-
13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe held that a woman's right to procure an abortion is protected
by the constitutional right of privacy until a point in pregnancy where the state's interest in
mother and fetus becomes "compelling." Id. at 162-63.
14. 469 Pa. at 283-84, 365 A.2d at 152-53 (Manderino, J., concurring). Justice Manderino
contended there is no "compelling state interest" involved which would warrant state inter-
ference with a married person's right to engage in extramarital relations.
15. Id. at 284-87, 365 A.2d at 153-55 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice Pomeroy also dis-
sented, but did not reach the merits of the case. He insisted that the order of the trial court,
granting judgment on the issue of liability only, was not appealable since it was not a final
order. Thus, the supreme court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. Id. at 288-91, 365 A.2d
at 155-56 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
16. It may be somewhat of a misnomer that the tort was denominated "criminal conversa-
tion" since the penalty was civil. The word "criminal" was employed because adultery was
an ecclesiastical crime. "Conversation" signified the act of intercourse. For a discussion of
the origin and history of the tort see Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COLUM. L.
REv. 651, 653-58 (1930) [hereinafter cited as Lippman].
17. See cases cited at note 7 supra; Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on "Heart Balm," 33
MICH. L. REv. 979, 989 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Feinsinger]; Lippman, supra note 16, at
655-56.
18. See Lippman, supra note 16, at 655-56; Comment, Criminal Conversation: Civil Ac-
tion for Adultery, 25 BAYLOR L. REv. 495 (1973), quoting 2 W. BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES
139 (1768).
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sage of the Married Women's Acts, 9 the right to bring suit for crimi-
nal conversation was extended to the wife to equalize the spouses'
rights.2 0 The basic character of the tort of criminal conversa-
tion-founding liability upon a single act of adultery with the
spouse of another2 -remained intact. Thus, as the supreme court
in Fadgen intimated, the archaic fiction of property rights in one's
spouse was not destroyed by its decision in Karchner; it was revital-
ized.
It appears that the Fadgen court's hostility toward these common
law underpinnings of the tort prompted its conclusion that criminal
conversation should be abolished. In referring to the action as an
anachronism, the court seemed to imply that today, enjoying sexual
intercourse with one's spouse is not a property right, and the loss of
exclusive marital intercourse does not constitute a wrong or an in-
jury recognized in the law.22 It is difficult to assail this much of the
court's reasoning. Sexual intimacy with one's spouse in not a
"property interest" in the normal sense of that term, whether in the
context of the rights protected by due process of law or in the sense
of common law interests worthy of legal protection.
The difficulty with Fadgen lies in the additional arguments pre-
sented by the court in support of its decision to abolish the tort of
criminal conversation, arguments which do not necessarily uphold
19. For a discussion of the Married Women's Acts see Karchner v. Mumie, 398 Pa. 13,
156 A.2d 537 (1959).
20. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Karchner v. Mumie, 398 Pa. 13, 156 A.2d 537
(1959), extended the right to bring suit for criminal conversation to the wife. See also Oppen-
heim v. Kridel, 236 N.Y. 156, 140 N.E. 227 (1923). The Oppenheim court, in justifying
extending the cause of action for criminal conversation to the wife, referred to the possible
doubt cast upon the legitimacy of the wife's children as the "principal reason assigned in all
the authorities for the protection of the husband." This reason, the court stated, "may be
offset by the interest which the wife has in the bodily and mental health of her children when
they are legitimate." Id. at 161, 140 N.E. at 229.
21. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
22. Cf. Gaines v. Poindexter, 155 F. Supp. 638 (W.D. La. 1957) (denying recovery for the
loss of companionship or affections of a human being, the enjoyment of which is not a
property right); Rotwein v. Gersten, 160 Fla. 736, 36 So. 2d 419 (1948) (marriage creates
mutual right of consortium and affection not protected by the Federal Constitution); Pen-
nington v. Stewart, 212 Ind. 553, 10 N.E.2d 619 (1937) (word "property" in constitution
means something which one has a right to possess and dispose of, as one's interest in land
and chattels); Hanfgarn v. Mark, 274 N.Y. 22, 8 N.E.2d 47 (1937) (rights of husband in wife's
affections and society not "property" within meaning of due process clause). See generally
Note, The Case for Retention of Causes of Action for Intentional Interference with the Marital
Relationship, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 426, 433-34 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Intentional
Interferencel.
. Vol. 15: 709
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its determination that complete abrogation of the action was the
most prudent approach. The court buttressed its holding by point-
ing to the susceptibility of the action to abuse, the difficulty of
valuating injuries of a psychic nature and the lack of meaningful
defenses to the defendant. In regard to the court's contention that
the action was prone to abuse, procedural limitations and judicial
discretion have been deemed adequate safeguards against abuse in
other areas of the law susceptible to spurious claims.13 With respect
to assessing damages, cases dealing with the emerging causes of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress,24 suits for inju-
ries resulting from fright or nervous shock caused without physical
impact, 5 and causes of action for prenatal injuries" provide ample
evidence that monetary valuation of nonphysical injuries is possi-
ble; the inherent difficulty of proving such injuries is arguably not
an adequate ground in itself for completely extinguishing a rem-
edy." As to the court's concern over the unavailability of valid de-
fenses, cases dealing with defamation, trespass and negligence illus-
trate that courts have been able to devise defenses or restructure a
cause of action to include the elements of fault, consent, or privi-
23. See Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973) (for
every substantial wrong, one should have a remedy); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d
351 (1971) (in abolishing parental immunity, child's interest in freedom from injury caused
by tortious conduct of others outweighs any danger of fraud or collusion); Flagiello v. Pennsyl-
vania Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 208 A.2d 193 (1965) (rejecting possibility of excessive litigation as
justification for continuation of charitable immunity); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164
A.2d 93 (1960) (child afforded recovery for prenatal injuries despite danger of fictitious suits).
24. E.g., Papieves v. Kelly, 437 Pa. 373, 263 A.2d 118 (1970) (freedom from mental distress
directly caused by wanton or outrageous conduct entitled to legal protection, independent of
any other cause of action). See generally W. PROsSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 12
(4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PRossER]; Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance
in the Law of Torts, 49 HARv. L. RFv. 1033 (1936); Smith, An Independent Tort Action for
Mental Suffering and Emotional Distress, 7 DRAKE L. REv. 53 (1958).
25. See, e.g., Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970) (if actual fear that
physical impact will occur is present, recovery allowed for injuries resulting from fright or
shock alone).
26. See, e.g., Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960) (child afforded recovery
for prenatal injuries negligently inflicted by defendant).
27. Assuming damages for criminal conversation could be determined, the nature of the
wrong is such that juries are apt to occasionally make excessive awards. In Tice v. Mandel,
76 N.W.2d 124 (N.D. 1956), the North Dakota Supreme Court resorted to two traditional
judicial tools in limiting an excessive award-comprehensive jury instructions setting out
damage guidelines, and use of its power to require remittitur. As Tice illustrates, it is argua-
bly an unnecessarily restrictive view of the capability of courts to assert that the difficulty in
assessing damages limits judicial ability to make injured persons whole.
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lege. 5 The Fadgen decision would have been more persuasive had
the court employed some sort of balancing approach to determine
whether these detrimental aspects of criminal conversation clearly
outweighed any of the tort's salutary aspects."0
What may have influenced the Fadgen court to totally abrogate
this common law cause of action is the fact that although in many
cases of marital infidelity injuries such as disgrace, humiliation,
wounded pride and hurt feelings do exist,3" they are not compensa-
ble wrongs. It does not lie within the power of our judicial system
to remedy all human wrongs. Many flagrant wrongs such as insults,
profanity, indignity and annoyance go unrecompensed because they
are beyond any effective and administratively efficient means of
legal redress. 31 Furthermore, the purpose of the tort of criminal con-
versation traditionally has been to preserve the marital unit by
deterring outsiders from interfering with others' marital relation-
ships.3 1 However, since such conduct is rarely preplanned and both
parties are usually at fault, the tort's preventative function appears
to be ineffective.3 3 Moreover, to acknowledge a single extramarital
28. See PROSSER, supra note 24, §§ 16, 18, 67, 113-16.
29. See generally Feinsinger, supra note 17, at 1008-09, where the author asserts that the
characteristic which distinguishes criminal conversation is its connotation of sexual misbe-
havior which causes moral indignation and emotion to prevail in the measurement of damages
over the consideration of private or public wrong. Furthermore, the disproportionate publicity
that such actions attract encourage fraudulent claims and out-of-court settlements by inno-
cent defendants. Id. See also Kane, Heart Balm and Public Policy, 5 FORDHAM L. REv. 63
(1936); Intentional Interference, supra note 22, at 429-33.
30. Many cases also hold that the gist of the tort of criminal conversation consists of the
defilement of the marriage bed, doubt cast upon the legitimacy of offspring, and the endan-
gering of the social order. See, e.g., Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 (1904). Some cases refer
to the blow to family honor and injury to the social position of the wronged spouse. E.g.,
Matusak v. Kulczewski, 295 Pa. 208, 145 A. 94 (1928).
31. See Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 945 (1964) (refusing to create cause of action for wrongful life, although acknowledging
that father's conduct towards illegitimate child was tortious); Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d
481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966) (no damages allowed for disadvantages of
illegitimate birth and stigma of bastardy). See generally PROSSER, supra note 24, § 12.
32. See, e.g., Joseph v. Naylor, 257 Pa. 561, 101 A. 846 (1917) (husband allowed punitive
damages for defendant's adulterous relations with his wife, not only to compensate husband,
but to punish defendant); Cornelius v. Hambay, 150 Pa. 359, 24 A. 515 (1892) (sexual inter-
course with another's wife involves private wrong and public offense). See also Feinsinger,
supra note 17, at 991.
33. See Hall & Poteete, Do You, Mary, and Anne, and Beverly, and Ruth, Take These
Men ... , PsYcH. TODAY, Jan. 1972, at 57, containing evidence that extramarital sexual
activity is becoming not only more common, but more acceptable, apparently, even to the
marriage partners.
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sexual experience in court arguably would tend more to destroy a
marriage rather than to sustain it. Thus, the action seems ill-suited
to remedy private wrongs or to punish violations of accepted canons
of social conduct. 4
Whereas several other jurisdictions have abolished criminal con-
versation statutorily,5 the Fadgen court was the first court to do so
judicially .3  The decision therefore raises issues not only as to the
power of the judiciary to alter established common law principles,
but also the desirability of such judicial legislating. In support of its
power to abolish the tort of criminal conversation, the Fadgen court
cited several cases in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
abrogated judicially created immunities.37 In each of those cases,
however, the supreme court removed an affirmative defense to a
particular cause of action in order to allow recovery against certain
parties previously absolved from liability." These decisions actually
expanded liability rather than limiting or abolishing it.
Although the immunity cases are thus factually distinguishable
from Fadgen, several broader principles underlie those decisions
which in fact support the Fadgen court's determination that it had
the authority to erase criminal conversation from Pennsylvania
common law. Those immunities were initially created by the court
for reasons of public policy. 9 When the social and economic condi-
34. See Foster, Relational Interests of the Family, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 493. The author
asserts that the action for criminal conversation "placates the cuckold, no matter what
provocation he may have given." Id. at 517.
35. For a list of statutes abolishing the tort of criminal conversation see 469 Pa. at 280-81
n.7, 365 A.2d at 151 n.7.
36. In fact, it appears that Fadgen is the first decision to extinguish any common law
cause of action in tort. Id. at 286, 365 A.2d at 154 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
37. 469 Pa. at 281-82, 365 A.2d at 151-52. In Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ.,
453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court abolished the doctrine of
governmental immunity. The doctrine was an outgrowth of medieval absolutism and a prod-
uct of a social climate which placed industrial development and public convenience above
the individual. Id. at 589, 593, 305 A.2d at 879, 881. The court concluded that the doctrine of
governmental immunity was an anachronism, and held that the burden of injuries resulting
from the government's wrongful acts, rather than imposed on a single, injured person, must
be distributed among the community where it can be borne without hardship. Id. at 593, 305
A.2d at 881. On similar grounds, the charitable immunity doctrine was judicially abandoned
in Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 208 A.2d 193 (1965). In Falco v. Pados, 444
Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court abrogated the parental im-
munity doctrine, reasoning that the theory of family disruption on which the doctrine was
based has no valid justification with the advent of liability insurance.
38. See note 37 supra; PROSSER, supra note 24, § 131.
39. See cases cited at note 37 supra.
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tions changed significantly, the court took the initiative to abrogate
them. The principle of stare decisis, the court felt, should not be
adhered to merely for the sake of certainty in the law,40 and it was
unnecessary to relegate to the legislature the task of reform. Thus,
these cases evidence the court's increasingly liberal use of discretion
in evaluating the soundness of its previous decisions as well as its
power to make abrupt changes in judicially created rules when the
policies which support those rules are no longer valid." If the court
correctly perceived that the tort of criminal conversation no longer
serves the purpose for which it was originally created, and does not
conform to modem social or sexual mores, it seems that both pre-
cedent and basic notions of common law jurisprudence support the
view that the Fadgen court had the power to expunge criminal con-
versation from Pennsylvania's common law.
It seems sensible for the court to abolish this common law cause
of action. As many commentators have observed, legislatures are
generally indifferent to questions of judge-made tort law and to
whether reform is in order. 2 Hence, this area of domestic law,
largely judge-made, is one where courts should assert more initiative
to complement the legislature and to exercise a creative role in
improving the law. 3 Arguably, the court's processes make it the
40. See generally von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 HARv. L.
REV. 409, 410-20 (1924) [hereinafter cited as von Moschzisker]. The author contends that
"maximum good and minimum harm is the chief mission of stare decisis, although those who
fail to understand what the doctrine seeks to accomplish mistakenly believe it based on the
premise that certainty in the law is preferable to reason and correct legal principles." Id. at
414.
41. See Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973), where
the court stated:
A rule which in its origin was the creation of the courts themselves, and was supposed
in the making to express the mores of the day, may be abrogated by the courts when
the mores have so changed that perpetuation of the rule would do violence to the social
conscience.
Id. at 602, 305 A.2d at 886. See also von Moschzisker, supra note 40, at 410, 414.
42. See generally Cowan, Rule or Standard in Tort Law, 13 RUTGERS L. REV. 141.(1958);
Keeton, Judicial Law Reform-A Perspective on the Performance of Appellate Courts, 44
TEX. L. REv. 1254, 1260 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Keeton]; Peck, The Role of Courts and
Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. REV. 265, 269-86 (1963) [hereinafter cited
as Peck]. Peck reveals some of the realities of the legislative process that hinder reform of
tort law, including (1) legislatures which are indifferent to tort law-making; (2) representa-
tives who lack experience, time and adequate wages; and (3) representatives who fail to hold
satisfactory committee and public hearings and are subject to well-organized pressure groups.
43. See generally Keeton, supra note 42, at 1261-62; Peck, supra note 42, at 285. Peck
asserts that "to argue that judicial creativity properly confined to areas where no conflict with
representative determination exists is contrary to our democratic tradition is to argue that
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superior instrument to effect reforms in this field." Legislatures are
seldom alert to social needs not championed by effective lobbies,
whereas social problems make up the standard grist of a court's
daily work." The secretive and consensual nature of illicit sexual
activities, and the lack of public outrage or disapproval of such acts,
provide one explanation for legislative inattention to marital prob-
lems and also militate against legislative involvement in this area.
On the other hand, the court's knowledge of the history of the ac-
tion, as well as its ability to appraise the rationale of the existing
rule and to weigh the competing policy considerations, made it emi-
nently more competent to determine the viability of such a cause
of action.
Were Fadgen a situation where the judicial abolition of a common
law cause of action contravened an expressed legislative intent, the
decision would be more difficult to defend. Arguably, however,
Fadgen only furthers what the Pennsylvania General Assembly had
partly accomplished. Insofar as interference with domestic relations
is concerned, the Pennsylvania lawmakers have not seen fit to pass
legislation regarding civil liability since the 1930's. In 1935, the
General Assembly abolished the cause of action for alienation of
affections."6 A review of the legislative history of the act abolishing
alienation of affections does not indicate that the legislature specifi-
cally intended to retain criminal conversation as a cause of action, 7
one of those traditions is itself in conflict with others." Id. at 292. See also Comment,
Comments on Maki v. Frelk-Comparative v. Contributory Negligence: Should the Court or
Legislature Decide?, 21 VAND. L. REv. 889, 892-95 (1968).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recently exercised its "lawmaking" authority to
improve other areas of the law as well. See Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 292
A.2d 286 (1972) (rejecting rule that psychiatric evidence is inadmissible in murder prosecu-
tion to determine whether defendant acted in heat of passion); Reitmeyer v. Sprecher, 431
Pa. 284, 243 A.2d 395 (1968) (rejecting prior limitation on landlord's liability for defective
conditions; Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964) (court aban-
doned the "place of the injury" rule in favor of more flexible interest analysis); Common-
wealth v. Ladd, 402 Pa. 164, 166 A.2d 501 (1960) (rejecting common law rule that one is not
legally responsible for a killing where death ensued beyond a year and a day after the fatal
blow). But see Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 401 Pa. 242, 164 A.2d 98 (1960) (refusing to
change M'Naughten Rule).
44. See generally Keeton, Creative Continuity in Tort Law, 75 HARv. L. REv. 463, 475-76
(1962); Peck, supra note 42, at 296.
45. See generally Peck, supra note 42, at 269-89.
46. 1935 Pa. Laws 450, § 1, as amended by 1937 Pa. Laws 2317, § 1 (now codified as PA.
STAT. ANN. tit 48, § 170 (Purdon 1965).
47. The original bill passed by the Pennsylvania House of Representatives abolished
causes of action for criminal conversation and seduction as well as for alienation of affections
1977
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and many commentators have stated there is virtually no difference
between the two causes of action. 8 Both were intended to serve the
same deterrent function, both afforded redress for similar injuries,
and each was susceptible to the abuses of fraud, collusion, black-
mail, and extortion which the Pennsylvania legislature noted in
support of its abolition of alienation of affections.' Moreover, it
appears that the burden of proof necessary to sustain an alienation
of affections action was more exacting than criminal conversation,
since the spouse had to affirmatively demonstrate a loss of consor-
tium. In a criminal conversation action, however, such loss was
conclusively presumed from the commission of adultery alone. 0
Also, while proof of adultery was considered sufficient to sustain an
action for criminal conversation, it was not sufficient to sustain an
action for alienation of affections; in the latter situation it was con-
ceivable that companionship or affection could remain undimin-
ished in spite of the adultery.5 Accordingly, the Fadgen court's
action abolishing the tort of criminal conversation seems to further
the legislative will evidenced by the extinguishment of alienation of
affections.
Yet another factor which supports the result in Fadgen is that the
abolition of the tort of criminal conversation is consistent with re-
cent doctrinal developments in this area of the law. In 1972, the
Pennsylvania legislature abolished the crime of adultery. 2 In re-
and breach of promise to marry. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary, however, deleted
from the proposed legislation the provisions abolishing criminal conversation and seduction
for reasons which were never articulated. The Senate version was thereafter adopted by the
House without debate. See PA. LEGIS. J. 4508 (1935) (House).
It has been held that in construing legislation, the deletion of words from a bill before its
passage should be given little weight, since the court has no way of knowing the reasons which
influenced the legislature. See, e.g., Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87 (1935); Holt v.
Middlebrook, 214 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 1954). Pennsylvania courts have expressly held, however,
that the Act of 1935 did not abolish criminal conversation. Baldridge v. Matthews, 378 Pa.
566, 106 A.2d 809 (1954); Antonelli v. Xenakis, 363 Pa. 375, 69 A.2d 102 (1949) (Act of June
22, 1935 did not abolish criminal conversation expressly or by implication, since all provisions
of law decreasing jurisdiction of court of record are to be strictly construed).
48. See Brown, The Action for Alienation of Affections, 82 U. PA. L. Rxv. 472, 473-75
(1934) [hereinafter cited as Brown].
49. See PROSSER, supra note 24, § 124; Brown, supra note 48, at 475.
50. Compare Gross' Adm'r v. Ledford, 190 Ky. 526, 228 S.W. 24 (1921) (in action for
criminal conversation, loss of consortium presumed from act of adultery alone), with Mission
v. Grossman, 329 Pa. 151, 196 A. 494 (1938) (in alienation of affections action, proof of
adultery, standing alone, does not warrant recovery).
51. See note 50 and accompanying text supra. See also Brown, supra note 48, at 475.
52. See 1972 Pa. Laws 1482, ch. 31.
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pealing the legislation which made adultery a criminal act, the
Pennsylvania Crimes Code followed the recommendations of the
Model Penal Code, 3 in which the American Law Institute opined
that it is inappropriate for the .government to enforce purely moral
or religious standards or to attempt to control behavior that has no
substantial social significance except as to the morality of the
actor.54 The decriminalization of adultery renders the tort of crimi-
nal conversation, always viewed as the civil counterpart of the crime
of adultery, all the more suspect as a viable or proper form of re-
dress. In addition, some recent state and federal courts have inter-
preted the fourteenth amendment right of privacy as affording pro-
tection to individuals making decisions regarding a broad range of
sexual and other private experiences to be free from governmental
interference.5 One spouse's decision to engage in sexual intercourse
with someone outside the marriage entity, as well as the third per-
son's intimate sexual conduct, is, perhaps, beyond the reach of
governmental regulation.
53. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
54. Id. § 207.1, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
55. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (use by and availability of contraceptives
to unmarried persons protected by right of privacy); Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hosp., 479 F.2d
756 (7th Cir. 1973) (woman's right to have abortion without consent of putative father pro-
tected by fourteenth amendment); Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 847 (1968) (sodomy between married couple constitutionally protected); Lovisi v. Slay-
ton, 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973) (sodomy between unmarried consenting adults pro-
tected); United States v. Brewer, 363 F. Supp. 606 (M.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 751 (3d
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 990 (1974) (dictum) (homosexual sodomitic acts protected);
Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alas. 1975) (possession and use of marijuana within privacy of
home protected). But see Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va.
1975), afj'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976), noted in 15 DUQ. L. REv. 123 (1976) (affirming without
opinion decision of a three-judge district court validating a state's right to criminalize sexual
acts between consenting homosexuals carried out in privacy of home).
In addition, many legal commentators have maintained that it is not the function of the
state, through its judiciary or legislature, to act as a moral arbiter. See generally H. HART,
LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963); Comment, Roe and Paris: Does Privacy Have a
Principle?, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1974); Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for
Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 670 (1973). As one author observed:
No doubt it is true that if deviations from conventional sexual morality are tolerated
by the law and come to be known, the conventional morality might change in a
permissive direction. . . . But even if the conventional morality did so change, the
society in question would not have been destroyed or "subverted." We should compare
such a development not to the violent overthrow of government but to a peaceful
constitutional change in its form, consistent not only with the preservation of a society
but with its advance.
HART, supra at 52.
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Fadgen represents an enlightened view by the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court as to the relationship between a government and its
citizenry. Adulterous relationships is arguably one area where state
nonintervention should be the rule, except to provide a means for
dissolving the marriage if such relationships render a continued
marriage impossible. This is especially true today where extramari-
tal relationships do not elicit the same public outrage as they did
in the past. Since the majority of jurisdictions still recognize actions
for interference with the marriage entity, Fadgen may provide the
impetus for other courts to reevaluate the legal foundation of such
actions.
Grayce Remiszewski
